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KEY INFORMANT MODELS FOR MEASURING  GROUP-LEVEL VARIABLES IN 
SMALL GROUPS: APPLICATION TO PLURAL SUBJECT THEORY 
 
 
Abstract  
We offer a new conceptualization and measurement models for constructs at the group-level of 
analysis in small group research. The conceptualization starts with classical notions of group 
behavior proposed by Tönnies, Simmel, and Weber and then draws upon plural subject theory by 
philosophers Gilbert and Tuomela to frame a new perspective applicable to many forms of small 
group behavior. In the proposed measurement model, a collective property is operationalized as 
shared interpersonal action that explicitly allows us to control for systematic (method) error and 
random error. Group members act as key-informants of group properties and processes and are 
treated as methods in a multi-trait multi-method setting to validate our models. The models are 
applied to empirical data of 277 three-person groups to develop and illustrate new procedures for 
ascertaining variation in measures due to hypothesized construct(s), method error, and random 
error. Implications and guidelines for small group research are discussed. 
 
Key Words: Key informant model, small groups, construct validity, multi-trait multi-method 
matrix, plural subject theory 
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KEY INFORMANT MODELS FOR MEASURING  GROUP-LEVEL VARIABLES IN 
SMALL GROUPS: APPLICATION TO PLURAL SUBJECT THEORY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In this paper, we develop and present a theory-based methodology to measure small 
group level characteristics and processes in a way that corrects for systematic and measurement 
errors. Our proposed approach builds on the key informant technique described by Seidler 
(1974). The key informant technique relies on “a small number of knowledgeable participants, 
who observe and articulate social relationships for the researcher “ (Seidler 1974:816). In our 
case, small group members serve as informants to provide first-hand information about the 
functioning of shared goal-directed activities of group members. 
 How small groups are conceived constrains how they are measured and studied. The 
small group characteristics and processes we study draw inspiration from classic 
conceptualizations in sociology as a prelude to a new formulation based on plural subject theory. 
Before we describe plural subject theory, it is helpful to point out how our interpretation of the 
small group has its origins in classical perspectives. 
Historical perspectives on small groups 
 The notion of a small group grows out of early developments in sociology, where a 
number of aspects of small groups seem essential to their constitution. One is the relationship 
among members of the group. Tönnies (1963) conceived of “community” as a grouping of 
persons based on feelings of togetherness. Simmel (1971) added the idea of a shared awareness 
of being a member of a group as a defining quality. Indeed, he claimed that a kind of shared 
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unity in the minds of group members was at the heart of its meaning: “the consciousness of 
constituting with the others a unity is actually all there is to this unity” (Simmel 1971:75). 
 Weber (1978) deepened the conceptualization of interpersonal aspects of social behavior 
by introducing subjective meaning of action and social coordination: “In ‘action’ is included in 
all human behavior when and insofar as the acting individual attaches subjective meaning to 
check it…[action becomes social when] by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the 
acting individual(s) it takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its 
course” (Weber 1978:88). His explication of social action rests on an interpretation of action that 
is performed with another person(s) in mind but does not require actual interactions among 
persons and does not require mutual consciousness of the others’ actions or even the presence of 
the other. 
 Although Tönnies, Simmel, and Weber provide useful perspectives for thinking about 
social entities, they leave unanswered questions about what a small group is, what the nature of 
social consciousness is (e.g., whether it resides solely in the minds of individual members of a 
social unit, as for Weber, or whether it can be shared in some sense, as in Simmel’s 
underdeveloped perspective), and in what sense members of a small group must be linked to 
each other, subjectively and objectively, to give the small group its identity and capacity to act. 
Plural subject theory, as developed by Margaret Gilbert and Raimo Tuomela, provides a starting 
point for our approach to measurement of small group characteristics and processes that 
addresses these questions, as developed below. 
Plural Subject Theory 
 Theory and method often constrain each other and have implications for measurement 
models. This is especially important in group-level research designs in order to utilize a 
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congruent perspective at the level of theory, the level of measurement, and the level of statistical 
analysis (e.g., Klein, Dansereau, and Hall 1994). Our starting point is plural subject theory, to 
study questions of group intentionality and cohesion, in which our proposed methodological 
approach is grounded.  
Gilbert (1989:152) defines a social group, as one where “each of a certain set of persons 
must correctly view himself and the rest, taken together, as ‘us*’ or ‘we*’”. “We” of course 
refers to the “self” plus at least one other person, but Gilbert (1989:465) points out a stronger 
sense of “we” that forms the foundation for plural subject theory. For Gilbert, “we” refers to the 
self and one or more others “that share in the action of a verb” (e.g., doing things together). She 
then maintains that collectivity concepts should incorporate the idea of plural subjects into their 
meaning. In contrast to “singularism”, which is defined as “the thesis that these [collective] 
concepts are explainable solely in terms of the conceptual scheme of singular agency”, Gilbert 
advocates “intentionalism”, which she specifies as “the view that according to our everyday 
collectivity concepts, individual human beings must see themselves in a particular way in order 
to constitute a collectivity” (Gilbert 1989:12). The requisite to share in an action of a verb, which 
is Gilbert’s main contribution to plural subject theory and diverges from Simmel’s (1971) limited 
idea of consciousness as the basis for social unity, means that group members have a collective 
goal and are jointly committed to achieving the goal together (Gilbert 2000). 
 To summarize, Gilbert’s (1989:204-236) concept of a social group requires that members 
think of themselves as “us”, “we”, “our”, etc., the members are jointly ready to act in a group 
action to accomplish a group goal, and common knowledge among members exists to this effect. 
She contrasts her ontology of group wills with tit-for-tat or the commonly accepted view based 
on “an ‘exchange of promises’ such that each person unilaterally binds himself to the goal in 
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question, leaving himself beholden for release to someone else upon whom, through this 
particular transaction, he has no claim” (Gilbert 1989:7). Instead, Gilbert (1989:204) asserts that 
individual wills of group members are bound to a group “simultaneously and interdependently” 
such that “each expresses a conditional commitment of his will, understanding that only if the 
others express similar commitments are all of the wills jointly committed to accept a certain goal 
when the time comes” (emphasis in original). In other words, “only when everyone has done 
similarly [i.e., expressed a conditional commitment] is anyone committed” (Gilbert 1989:7; 
emphasis in original). For an introduction to plural subject theory as proposed by leading 
theorists and suggestions for adapting the ideas to goal-directed behavior, see Bagozzi (2000, 
2005, pp. 103-110). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we present the theoretical foundation 
of our proposed measurement approach. Next, we develop the measurement framework for 
assessing construct validity and predictive validity of small group constructs. Third, we present 
an empirical investigation designed to test and validate our proposed framework. Overall, based 
on the congruency of level of theory, measurement, and analysis, the findings for new multi-trait, 
multi-method (MTMM) construct validity and predictive validity models are then summarized. 
The paper concludes with an interpretation of the results, a discussion of the study’s limitations, 
some suggestions for small group researchers, and directions for future research. 
PROPOSED MEASUREMENT MODEL 
Small-group measurement  
Many social activities occur in small group settings where the individual interacts with 
one or more other individuals (e.g., family decision making, work-place teams, online gaming as 
part of a group). Although much can be learned by limiting investigations to characteristics of 
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individuals in such settings, many relevant independent and dependent variables concern the 
small group as an entity (Morgeson and Hofmann 1999). Researchers have given increasing 
attention to the study of group-level research questions in recent years. Among others, studies 
have examined trust, commitment, cooperation, conflict, negotiation, and power in relationships, 
and investigated dyadic and family decision making, social influence, and communal activity 
(Croon and Veldhoven 2007; Iverson 1991).  
In group-level studies, the individuals, the interpersonal interactions between individuals, 
and the group itself form a hierarchical system, in which individual actions are dependent on 
each other. Non-independence refers to the fact that in group-level research, responses provided 
by individuals in the group are likely to be correlated with one another (Kenny 1996; Kenny and 
La Voie 1985; Kenny, Kashy, and Cook 2006). Likewise, factors such as similarities of 
background and self-selection based on interpersonal attraction, shared demographics, and 
outlooks mean that members of a small group are likely to score similarly on various evaluative 
measures, and these scores may differ systematically across groups. From a methodological 
standpoint, the primary consequence of ignoring non-independence is to bias variance estimates 
either positively or negatively depending on the sign of the correlations between the scores in the 
small group (Kenny, Mannetti, Pierro, Livi, and Kashy 2002). Furthermore, if error terms in 
statistical models are correlated in terms of dependency, this will lead to biased estimates of 
standard deviations and significance estimations (Goldstein 2003; Snijders and Bosker 1999). 
One important gap in existing research across disciplines is the development of group-level 
construct operationalizations, measurements, and validations (Chan 1998; Klein, Dansereau, and 
Hall 1994; Meade and Elby 2007; Morgeson and Hofmann 1999; Yammarino and Dansereau 
 8 
2009). This is a focus of the present paper within the explicit context of plural subject theory as 
applied to goal-directed behavior. 
Concerns with existing group-level measurement approaches 
A common methodological practice in the literature is to study group-level research 
questions through information provided by one of the individuals in each group (e.g., Geyskens, 
Steenkamp, Scheer, and Jumar 1996; Morgan and Hunt 1994). When two or more individuals are 
included as informants in a study, analyses are performed on the measures provided by each 
individual separately (e.g., Heide and Miner 1992; Wathne, Giong, and Heide 2001) or their 
responses are averaged and then analyzed (e.g., Croon and van Veldhoven 2007; Kenny and La 
Voie 1985).  
Although aggregating individual-level data to a higher-level to explain context influences 
is very common, additive composition models suffer from a number of shortcomings. First, 
especially when the number of individuals in a group is small, research has shown that group-
level measures are unreliable (Aitkin and Longford 1986; O’Brien 1990). This results in biased 
estimates of contextual effects (Lüdtke et al. 2008). Second, in such cases, researchers have 
assumed that individual variables are measured without error, leading to biased parameter 
estimates (Hox 2002). Third, additive models neglect the original data structure (Snijders and 
Bosker 1999). That is, aggregated variables refer to higher-level, rather than individual-level, 
units or properties of the group as an entity. Fourth, additive variables measure the context in an 
overall or average sense, not individuals in relation to each other. Therefore, correlations at a 
higher-level are based on a marginal distribution of the frequencies of individuals within one 
context, while correlations at the individual-level are based on distributions within all contexts. 
Fifth, by aggregating data from many individual-level units to a smaller number of values of 
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higher-level units, information is lost, and statistical power suffers (Hox 2002). Finally, the 
interpretation of aggregated data is difficult, because very often the findings cannot be explained 
with a plausible theory (Klein, Dansereau, and Hall 1994; Dansereau and Yammarino 2000; 
Yammarino and Dansereau 2009).  
In the current research, we address these significant limitations of existing measurement 
approaches to studying group-level research questions with small groups. We offer a new 
operationalization and theory-based measurement model for constructs at a group level of 
analysis under plural subject theory. In the proposed measurement model, a group-level property 
is operationalized as shared interpersonal action in relation to a mutual goal in the group that 
explicitly allows us to control for method error and random error. Group members act as key-
informants of shared characteristics and processes in the group and are treated as methods in a 
MTMM model to validate our approach.  
Conceptualizing group-level concepts 
 Gilbert and other scholars in the plural subject tradition (e.g., Bratman 1999; Meggle 
2002; Searle 1990; Searle 1995; Tuomela 1995) are most concerned with the logical foundation 
of individual and social concepts. They do not address issues of measurement and hypothesis 
testing. To develop further Gilbert’s and other similar concepts of what has come to be known 
broadly in philosophy as “we-attitudes”, and suggest guidelines for operationalization, we begin 
with Tuomela’s (2002) prescient, abstract conceptualization of collective intentionality: “a 
person has a we-attitude A (say a goal, intention, or belief) if he has A, believes that the others in 
his collective (group) have A and believes in addition that there is a mutual belief in the 
collective that the members have A” (see also Tuomela 1995). 
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 Tuomela has not elaborated on this conceptualization, nor has he considered the 
complexities and the specification we develop hereafter. His concept of we-attitudes suggests 
two first-order judgments and one second-order judgment constituting collective intentionality 
that each member in a small group can make. To explicate this, let us consider a three-person 
group and focus on a we-intention (i.e., a shared intention to strive for a group goal together) for 
purposes of discussion. When the group members hold a we-intention, they collectively consider 
the conative proposition, “we intend to achieve X or do Y” (e.g., Gilbert 2002). From the point 
of view of each group member, each person to a different extent (1) has a we-intention, (2) 
believes or judges that each of his/her partners has the we-intention, and (3) believes or judges 
that all share jointly in the we-intention. Let the we-intention held by a person be Iwe. For 
example, the extent that person A believes that “we intend to achieve X or do Y” can be written 
in short-hand as AweI . We can specify we-intentions for persons B and C in a similar manner. The 
first two criteria above imply, for a three-person group, a total of nine first-order, constitutive 
judgments. Thus with A, B, and C referring to the three group members, the nine judgments 
include: (1) A, B, and C each holding we-intention, Iwe where each member could differ as a 
matter of degree in their judgment thereof, and (2) A believes that B and C each hold Iwe, B 
believes that A and C each hold Iwe, and C believes that A and B each hold Iwe, where again each 
member can differ in their judgment as to the strength of Iwe. These are first-order criteria 
because each person estimates the beliefs of a target person directly: either the self or the two 
partners in the group holding Iwe. 
 First-order judgments capture each person’s assessment of each group member’s 
commitment to a shared intention, Iwe. These judgments reflect one aspect of sociality, namely a 
type of personal consciousness of one’s own and others’ commitments to the group, but they do 
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not manifest a collective consciousness of shared intentionality, per se. To represent mutuality in 
the case of a three-person group, we examine second-order judgments of members in relation to 
each other. This means investigating the judgments that one member has that a second member 
(and third member) believes that each of the three members holds Iwe. 
 There are a total of 18 second-order judgments in a three person group. Taking person A 
as an example, we have the following six second-order judgments: person A judges that B 
believes that A holds Iwe, A judges that C believes that A holds Iwe, A judges that B believes that 
B holds Iwe, A judges that C believes that B holds Iwe, A judges that B believes that C holds Iwe, 
and A judges that C believes that C holds Iwe. Similarly, a total of six second-order judgments 
exist each for person B (e.g., B judges that A believes that B holds Iwe, etc.) and person C (e.g., C 
judges that A believes that C holds Iwe, etc.). The 18 second-order judgments fully reveal the 
mutuality of collective intentions held in common by the three group members, as expressed by 
each group member and existing as a matter of degree as judged by each group member. It 
should be noted that not all 27 judgments mentioned above are needed in specific tests of 
hypotheses in all cases, and useful and interesting submodels can be specified capitalizing on 
information contained in subsets of judgments (see, for example, the key-informant model 
described below which relies on only three judgments per informant). 
 In the Data Structure section, we present a parsimonious notation for depicting the 
aforementioned conceptualization of we-intentions. Collective concepts characterizing group-
level phenomena are represented through the combination of first-order and second-order 
judgments applied to a group property (in our case, the collective proposition, “we intend to 
achieve X or do Y”). For the case of a three-person group, this means recording nine first-order 
judgments (i.e., three self-judgments by members that each holds the collective concept and six 
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judgments—two by each member—that each of the other members hold the collective concept) 
and 18 second-order judgments (i.e., six judgments made by each member concerning the 
judgment that each of the other members has about the collective concept held by each of the 
members). Again although in the most comprehensive case, all such measures can be useful, 
there are special cases where subsets of measures are apt. 
Comparisons of our proposed model to dyadic designs and Seidler’s (1974) Key Informant 
Technique 
Some researchers engage in investigations of dyadic data in ways seemingly similar to 
Seidler’s original, dyadic approach (Henderson and Lee 1992; Kumar, Stern and Anderson 1993; 
Searle 1995; Nelson and Cooprider 1996). However, our proposed approach differs in two 
fundamental ways from dyadic designs. To understand the differences, consider Kenney and 
Winquist (2001) who describe three types of designs for collecting dyadic data: (1) a standard 
design where each member in a group is a member of one and only one dyad, (2) the social 
relations model, a round robin model where each member is paired with multiple others, and 
each of the others is paired with multiple others, and (3) the one-with-many design where again, 
each member is paired with multiple others, but each of the others is unpaired with all others. 
One way our proposed approach differs from dyadic designs is in the target of intentionality and 
in the manner in which data are collected. Briefly, like the round robin social relations model, 
but unlike the other dyadic designs, our approach requires that each member of a group supplies 
information about all other members in the group. However in contrast to the round robin design, 
in our proposed approach, each member of the group is also asked to provide information 
regarding oneself on collective properties. Moreover, unlike the round robin and the other 
approaches in dyadic analyses, our approach elicits second-order judgments by each member in 
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relation to all members, including oneself. Dyadic approaches are limited to the first-order 
judgments and then only a subset of the judgments we propose. To summarize, not only does our 
approach provide information by all members regarding all members, similar to the fullest 
dyadic design (i.e., the social relations model), but it goes beyond the fullest dyadic design to 
include self-referent data and second-order judgments of collective properties. These latter 
judgments provide estimates of shared consciousness, which are missing from psychological 
approaches to group behavior to date. This makes the nature and scope of our approach quite 
different from dyadic designs.  
A second and perhaps even more fundamental difference between our proposed approach 
and dyadic designs concerns the meaning of what is being measured. Dyadic designs measure 
feelings, perceptions, and similar psychological reactions that one person has of or toward 
another person and feelings, perceptions, and similar psychological reactions that the other 
person has of or toward the first person. The typical data concern back and forth reactions (e.g., 
liking, conflict, power) between people. The variances in responses are decomposed under the 
statistical social relations model into individual and social properties gleaned thereof. Under our 
approach, guided by plural subject theory, each person judges a collective property that is shared 
by group members. Critically, the target phenomenon is a group-level characteristic, not an 
individual-level property as is the case under dyadic designs. 
It is also important to note that our proposed approach and dyadic analyses are similar in 
one important respect. As explained earlier, when multiple members of a group provide 
information about, or react in relation to, other members, and the reactions are reciprocated in 
some sense, this leads to the problem of statistical non-independence (Kenny 1996). Both our 
 14 
proposed model and analyses and dyadic analyses take non-independence into account with 
correlated method terms, thereby overcoming certain problems with biased estimates. 
It also should be pointed out that our proposed measurement procedure is similar in some 
respects to the classic “key informant technique” developed by Seidler (1974), but has unique 
characteristics relative to it. First, unlike Seidler’s (1974) technique where informants operate at 
arm’s length to estimate properties of organizations which can be independent of the informants, 
our approach employs group members to supply information that capitalizes not only on their 
own estimates of group properties, but also on their own appraisals of estimates made by fellow 
members. This allows us to take into account social properties such as specified by Simmel and 
Weber. Second, in our approach, the constructs are defined at the level of mutuality of group 
members (e.g., joint decisions). They are not inanimate physical properties of the group as they 
are in Seidler’s (1974) technique, nor are they aggregates of individual person properties as is 
sometimes the case in some psychological and social science research for small groups. Instead, 
we are able to obtain measures of plural subject concepts as provided by members in a group 
interacting meaningfully with each other. 
Models for assessing construct validity and predictive validity  
A fundamental question regarding any measurement, and one which remains unanswered 
for operationalization of concepts under plural subject theory, is whether the observations 
actually indicate what they are supposed to measure. This is the classic definition of construct 
validity (i.e., do measures of concepts measure what they are purported to measure independent 
from random and systematic error), and is generally assessed with formal tests of convergent and 
discriminant validity by means of confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) (e.g., Bagozzi et al. 1991). 
For an overview and comparison of such construct validity models as the unmeasured single 
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method factor, additive trait-method-error, correlated uniqueness, correlated and dedicated 
marker variable, method-method pair, direct product, correlated trait-correlated method minus 
one, and multilevel confirmatory factor analysis models, see Bagozzi (2011, pp. 275-289). 
As we develop below, each group member serves as a key informant supplying 
independent information about a collective property of the group. For the case where there are 
three members in the group, three different models can be used to assess construct validity. The 
first and the simplest one is the classic key informant technique (Seidler 1974), where each group 
member provides three first-order judgments of a collective property (i.e., one self-judgment and 
estimates of each of the remaining two group members’ judgments). Three latent trait factors are 
specified—one collective property corresponding to information connected to each group 
member—and each factor has three reflective indicators: one by the self, the other two by the 
respective group members. As a consequence, only nine of 27 possible judgments are needed to 
implement the classic key informant model. We term our first model here, the revised classic key 
informant model, because unlike Seidler’s (1974) approach, our model explicitly represents and 
estimates systematic and random error, and in the process corrects for biases produced by these 
sources of error in estimates and tests of substantive hypotheses. 
In another of our suggested models, we utilize all 27 judgments and term the general 
model an expanded key informant model. By allowing methods to be correlated, systematic 
method biases can be taken into account. Thus, indications of trait, method, and error variance 
are provided by the squares of factor loadings, the covariances among the method factors, and 
the variances of disturbances respectively. To the best of our knowledge, this model is an 
original adaptation and extension of the classic key informant technique proposed by Seidler 
(1974), and the first to do so for data collected for plural subject theory variables (see Method for 
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a detailed description). Therefore, we believe that such a model has not been employed before to 
examine construct validity, nor has it been applied to plural subject theory data. The specific 
within-member expanded key informant model sub-case hypothesizes three factors representing a 
collective property where each factor is measured by three indicators, and each indicator is an 
aggregate of three judgments provided by one group member. Method bias with a target 
informant in common, is captured with correlated method factors. The specific across-member 
expanded key informant model sub-case also hypothesizes three factors representing a collective 
property, but now the three indicators consist of aggregates of judgments such that each arises 
from the self and two other group members, respectively. Method bias with a common 
informant, is captured with correlated method factors. Our re-specification of the classic key 
informant technique does not aggregate triplets of judgments as done in the expanded key 
informant models but rather keeps each judgment separate.  
Finally predictive validity of measures of the collective property, the we-intentions 
construct in our particular illustration, is modeled as a function of the degree of attachment that 
members have to their group in our empirical study presented hereafter. Based on the literature 
studying the effects of affective commitment in organizations (e.g., Allen and Myer 1996), we 
hypothesize that the greater the shared attachment to the group of members, the stronger the we-
intentions to participate together in the group in pursuit of a common goal. Structural equation 
models that take into account method bias (i.e., consider non-independence) as well as 
measurement error are used to test the hypotheses. 
EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATION 
To illustrate our proposed framework, we examine the we-intentions and shared 
attachment of team-mates belonging to small groups who engage in professional online gaming 
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activity. Respondents were 831 team members from 277 three-person teams with one team 
member designated arbitrarily as "captain" for purposes of data collection, where all members 
were effectively interchangeable and interacted together in competition with other teams entirely 
through organized websites. We measured many reactions of respondents with respect to the goal 
of playing together with team mates in competition with other teams. Team members responded 
to a web survey. Details concerning the data collection process and sample characteristics are 
available from the authors on request. 
Data Structure 
The data were collected from a design consisting of (a) a full round-robin (Warner, 
Kenny, and Stoto 1979), where every team member rated every other member of that team and 
augmented by both (b) a self-report component where respondents provided their own reactions 
to the same target questions, and (c) second-order ratings (see below). In our context, three 
individuals were involved in each team and therefore we used a triadic data collection design, 
where a judge A appraises how an actor B evaluates a partner C, as well as appraises how C 
evaluates B. In addition, each person evaluated his or her team-mates, as well as oneself. This 
situation can be characterized by using the notation of judge(actor(target)) or A(B(C)) (Laing, 
Phillipson, and Lee 1966). In our design, every team member puts oneself in the position of three 
roles (judge, actor, partner) in every triad that can be formed from the team (Bond, Horn, and 
Kenny 1997).  
Each participant was asked to think about his or her two friends that s/he regularly plays 
online games with and to mention their first names or nicknames in the beginning of each item 
battery. Our objective was to get respondents to think of their group and induce each respondent 
to imagine and focus on the task, self, and team-mates as vividly as possible. We concentrate 
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herein on the item batteries of measures of we-intentions and attachment to the team, although 
other measures were also obtained. 
After recalling the names and images of team-mates, each participant expressed his or her 
extent of agreement with the assertion, “we intend to participate together in on-line gaming 
sessions over the next month”. An elaborate description of the gaming session was provided so 
as to define the group activity as realistically as possible. Therefore, each team member 
expressed their own individual judgments (e.g., A), two dyadic judgments about their team-
mates (e.g., A(B) and A(C)), and second-order judgments about how they think that each team-
mate evaluates all others ( e.g., A(B(A)), A(B(B)), A(B(C)), A(C(A)), A(C(B)), A(C(C))).1 In 
contrast to the original generalized round-robin design (Bond, Horn, and Kenny, 1997), we also 
included self-judgments and second-order judgments because of the added information they 
provide for operationalizing plural subject theory and for estimating systematic error separate 
from measurement error. In the generalized round-robin design, questions corresponding to the 
diagonals, as well as the columns and rows, that belong to the judge are not collected, and this 
generalized round-robin design for N people contains N x (N-1) x (N-2) data points. Our research 
design, in contrast, is based on N3 data points. For a three-person team, we therefore have 27 
measures or data points per latent variable. We used seven-point, “strongly disagree” to 
“strongly agree”, scales to measure strength of agreement with the assertion, “we intend to 
participate together”. Participants also appraised the extent to which team members felt emotions 
of “attachment and belongingness” towards each, where seven-point, “not at all strong” to “very 
strong”, scales were employed (see Supplementary Materials). 
Table 1 provides an overview of our design. For perspective, the limited generalized 
round-robin design can be seen in the six entries with asterisks. The key informant model can be 
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seen in the nine entries enclosed by rectangles in Table 1. Thus, the key informant model and the 
generalized round-robin designs are special cases of our full design. Under the key-informant 
model, each judge provides information on his or her own and perceived others’ shared 
intentions. These are self and first-order judgments, respectively. Under the generalized round-
robin design each person provides what he or she believes are the judgments that one partner has 
of the remaining partner’s judgments and are also first-order perceptions. The full design 
provides second-order judgments, as well as the self and first-order judgments. As noted above, 
we term the full design, the expanded key-informant model, to indicate that it includes 
information from all possible perspectives: judgments of self, all first-order judgments of other 
team-mates, by each member, and all second-order judgments. With regard to we-intentions, 
respondents provided their judgments of the shared intentions held by each teammate, including 
the self. That is, each person served as an informant of a mutual intention, which is a group-level 
property. This differs from the social relations model, where each respondent reports on his or 
her personal judgment or feeling, which is an individual-level property, and does so in relation 
only to team-mates, not the self (e.g., Cook 1993).  
 In such a setup as described above it is important to consider that the link between raters 
and ratees is not ill structured (Putka et al. 2011). In this very specific setting of professional 
computer game leagues peers of one ratee were not close peers of another ratee. Furthermore, 
having a captain in each team who was selected by all team members, roles cannot be 
interchanged in MTMM settings. In our study, the "captain" was chosen arbitrarily for 
convenience to serve as a coordinator for data collection. Hence, our respondents in each group 
are interchangeable. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
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Analytical Procedure 
 The purpose of the present investigation is to develop and illustrate the revised classic 
key informant and expanded key-informant measurement models on group level constructs and 
demonstrate their use in construct validity and predictive validity contexts. First, we test for 
construct validity. As key informants in our model are equivalent to methods under the 
traditional MTMM analysis, we followed Widaman (1985) and Marsh (1989), and test and 
compare four different CFA models for the revised classic key-informant and expanded key-
informant cases: 
Null model: Only unique variances in measures are freely estimated. 
Single trait model: Only one general trait factor is estimated. Thus, it is assumed that all 
variances in measures can be completely explained by one general trait factor plus 
random error. In our application, the latent group-level construct therefore explains nine 
dyadic perceptions of team members. 
Correlated trait-error model: Variation in measures is explained by three correlated 
traits plus random error. Therefore in our application, variation in measures is explained 
by the three traits: for example, “we-intention of A”, “we-intention of B”, and “we-
intention of C”, plus random error. 
Correlated trait, correlated uniqueness model: Variation in measures is explained by 
three correlated traits, plus all correlated uniquenesses assigned to measures derived from 
the same method, plus random error.2  
Figure 1 illustrates the correlated trait, correlated uniqueness model for the revised classic key 
informant model. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
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The null, single trait, and correlated trait-error models are special cases of the correlated 
trait, correlated uniqueness model formed by constraining certain parameters, and are thus nested 
in it and can be compared using χ2-difference tests. The null model serves as a baseline model 
assuming no correlation of the measures in the population. The single trait model assumes one 
general trait factor defined by all measures. The correlated trait-error model assumes that method 
variance is negligible; thus, measures here only reflect trait and random error variance. The 
correlated trait, correlated uniqueness model assumes that variation in measures can be explained 
completely by traits, correlated uniqueness of common methods, and random error. Therefore, 
χ2-difference tests are used to test whether traits and correlated uniqueness of methods are 
present in our model. 
To assess construct validity of our measurement model, we tested for convergent and 
discriminant validity, and examined the existence of random error, as well as method bias 
(Bagozzi, Yi, and Phillips 1991). As there are no structural differences between the team 
members, we chose MTMM models for interchangeable raters (Eid et al. 2008). In our approach, 
team members are perceived as methods and cross-evaluate all three team members. Therefore, 
we have a three trait, three methods case. For the sake of didactical clearness, we did not 
integrate further meaningful indicators in this article. Nevertheless, our approach can easily be 
applied to multiple indicators to take care of these valid arguments.  
In the correlated trait, correlated uniqueness model: (1) convergent validity is achieved if 
the model fits satisfactorily. Further, the degree of convergence is greater, the higher are the 
factor loadings. High factor loadings can therefore be interpreted as group members agreeing on 
their assessments of their own and each member’s we-intention; (2) discriminant validity can be 
ascertained by scrutinizing factor correlations, determining whether they are significantly smaller 
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than 1.00. In our case, the existence of discriminant validity means that the three estimated we-
intentions for all team members are distinct and not in complete agreement. Hence, agreement 
amongst key informants will occur to the extent that factor correlations are high; (3) degree of 
random error will be reflected in the magnitude of error variances; and (4) the extent of method 
bias will be shown in the magnitude of correlated errors. 
Second, after demonstrating construct validity, we apply our revised key informant 
measurement model and show its predictive validity. Therefore, a causal model is analyzed, 
where a second-order attachment factor predicts a second-order we-intentions factor, and where 
both are measured by the revised key informant and expanded key-informant methods. An 
alternative analytical procedure to the one presented in here is added to the Supplementary 
Material. 
Analyses 
 We tested CFAs and SEMs using Mplus 7.2 (Muthén and Muthén 2007). To determine 
model fit, χ2 goodness-of-fit statistics, the non-normed fit index (NNFI), the comparative fit 
index (CFI), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), and the standardized root 
mean square residual (SRMR) were assessed following Hu and Bentler’s (1999) 
recommendations. Accordingly, an adequate-fitting model should have a relatively small, non-
significant chi-square value, NNFI and CFI values greater than or equal to .95, SRMR values 
smaller than or equal to .08, and RMSEA values smaller than .06. Marsh, Hau and Wen (2004) 
and others criticized the usage of precise numerical cutoff points and emphasized a more detailed 
look into model fit conditional on sample size, degrees of freedom and model specifications (see 
also Chen et al. 2008; Kenny, Kaniskan, and  McCoach 2014). Thus, we further looked into 
detailed fit statistics, related confidence intervals as joint usages to point estimates.   
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Results for the Key-Informant Model 
 To provide thorough and informative results, we present a series of analyses. Table 2 
presents the correlation matrix of the items in the revised key informant model along with their 
means and standard deviations. We start with the revised classic key-informant model applied to 
the we-intention construct and then analyze the expanded key-informant models. The full extent 
of the power of the analyses for purposes of interpretation will become more apparent in the 
Discussion. For the sake of readability, we only present essential statistical results here. The full 
statistical findings are available from the authors on request. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 Table 3 presents the results of the MTMM model comparisons. First note that we also 
estimated a correlated trait correlated methods model (CTCM), but it did not converge. The 
CTCM model often suffers from convergence and admissibility problems, mostly because of 
underidentification (Lance, Nobel, and Scullen 2002). Second note that the correlated trait, 
correlated uniqueness model is the superior model and fits the data very well: χ2 (15) = 21.12, 
p=.13, RMSEA=.04, SRMR=.02, NNFI=.995, and CFI=.998. Notice next that either the 
introduction of one general trait, correlated traits, or correlated uniqueness significantly drops the 
chi-square value, indicating a meaningful improvement over our null model (see also χ2-
difference tests in Table 3). Furthermore, the inclusion of correlated traits improves the model fit 
over the single trait model, indicating a need for different trait factors. Also, the integration of 
the correlated uniquenesses improves the model significantly over the correlated trait-error 
model, demonstrating the need for consideration of method effects. Overall, both correlated traits 
and correlated uniquenesses are needed. Furthermore, the satisfactory goodness-of-fit measures 
for the correlated trait, correlated uniqueness model imply that the data are explained well by the 
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underlying correlated traits and correlated uniqueness, except for random fluctuations. Thus, 
convergent validity is achieved for the we-intention construct in the correlated trait, correlated 
uniqueness version of the revised classic key informant model. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
To learn more about the degree of convergent validity, variance can be decomposed into 
trait, correlated uniqueness, and error components. As convergent validity can be defined as 
agreement among measures of the same trait evaluated by different methods, trait variation (the 
magnitude of shared variation of the three measures of a common trait factor) is an indicator of 
convergent validity (Bagozzi, Yi, and Phillips 1991). In our application, all factor loadings on the 
measures are statistically significant, indicating achievement of convergent validity. Trait factor 
loadings are moderately high, showing that variation due to the traits is good (see Table 4). 
Therefore, the measures of we-intention provided by informants A, B, and C are similar to each 
other.  
For discriminant validity, we see that correlations among traits are lower than unity, yet 
very high, suggesting that discriminant validity is not achieved as a practical matter. Therefore, 
across the total sample, the three estimated we-intentions for all team members are in agreement 
to a large extent. Such an outcome is desirable under plural subject theory because it 
demonstrates that group members are in agreement as to the degree of shared intentions, and thus 
the groups are highly coordinated internally. Note her that the correlations among traits have 
been corrected for random and systematic errors. To the extent that the correlations amongst 
traits deviate from 1.00, they suggest lack of agreement as to shared intentions amongst members 
of groups. Table 4 presents the trait factor loadings, correlated uniquenesses, and factor 
correlations.  
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[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The next step in our analysis of dyadic perceptions is to show the predictive validity of 
the key informant model. Thus, a causal model is analyzed, where a second-order attachment 
factor predicts a second-order we-intentions factor and both are measured by the classic key 
informant model (Figure 2). The model shows a satisfactory fit: χ2(110)=332.52, p<.001, 
RMSEA=.086, SRMR=.076, NNFI=.94 and CFI=.96. Furthermore, explained variance in we-
intentions is 55 percent, showing high predictive validity of the key informant model. Notice that 
this relatively high level of explained variance comes about as a result of a single exogenous 
construct predicting we-intentions. Had we proposed and tested two or more independent 
variables, explained variance would have likely been even greater. Table 5 presents the means, 
standard deviations, and composite reliabilities of measures. 
[Insert Figure 2 and Table 5 about here] 
In sum, we showed the construct validity and predictive validity of we-intentions under 
the revised key informant model. Note that only nine items out of 27 have been used so far, 
namely all first-order judgments. Next, we examine construct validity of we-intentions under the 
expanded key informant models. 
Results for the Expanded Key-informant Models 
In the expanded key-informant models, all 27 items of the full model (Table 1) are 
integrated into the CFA structure (see Bagozzi, 2005, pp. 109-110). We are interested in how 
judges estimate evaluations made by partners of themselves and other team-mates, as well as 
judgments made under the key informant model. The results for the expanded key informant 
model follow the similar procedure applied in the key informant model. We begin with the 
within-member’s perspective and then proceed with the across-member’s perspective. 
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The results of the nested CFAs tests in the within-member’s case are presented in Table 6. 
In the within-member case, each factor represents the estimations of one judge regarding all 
other team members. The correlated trait, correlated uniqueness model is again superior: χ2 (15) 
= 13.26, p=.58, RMSEA=.00, SRMR=.014, NNFI=1.00, and CFI=1.00. The introduction of one 
general trait, multiple correlated traits, or correlated uniqueness significantly drops the chi-
square, yielding meaningful improvements over our null model (see also the χ2 difference tests in 
Table 6). Also the inclusion of multiple correlated traits improves the model fit over the single 
trait model, indicating a need for different trait factors. Furthermore, the integration of the 
correlated uniqueness model improves the fit significantly over the correlated trait-error model, 
demonstrating the need for consideration of method effects. Overall, both correlated traits and 
correlated uniquenesses are needed in the final analysis. Based on satisfactory goodness-of-fit 
measures, we conclude that the data are completely explained by the underlying correlated traits 
and correlated uniquenesses, except for random fluctuations. Thus, convergent validity is 
achieved for the we-intention construct in the correlated trait, correlated uniqueness version of 
the within-member expanded key informant model (Figure 3). 
[Insert Table 6 and Figure 3 about here] 
To examine degree of convergent validity, observed variances are decomposed into trait, 
correlated uniqueness, and error. All factor loadings on the measures are statistically significant, 
with high loadings indicating satisfactory convergent validity. Therefore, each team member is 
consistent in assessing both his or her own we-intention and the other team members’ we-
intentions, once systematic and measurement errors have been taken into account. Further we see 
that all error variances are statistically significant. Also seven of the nine uniqueness correlations 
are significant. Correlations among traits are significantly lower than unity, suggesting 
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achievement of discriminant validity. As the trait intercorrelations are moderate to moderately 
high in value, the team members do not agree highly among themselves in terms of their own 
estimates of we-intention (i.e., for agreement of team members, it is desired ideally that 
discriminant validity between factors is low, that is, correlations should be close to 1.00). Table 7 
presents the parameter estimates for the within-members model.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
To demonstrate predictive validity of the expanded key informant within-members 
model, we ran a causal model, where again a second-order attachment factor predicts a second-
order we-intentions factor. The causal model fits the data satisfactorily: χ2 (110)=348.11, p<.001, 
RMSEA=.089, SRMR=.080, NNFI=.94 and CFI=.96. Explained variance in we-intentions is 40 
percent, indicative of predictive validity. Again, this level of explained variance is obtained with 
a single predictor. Factor loadings, error variances, correlated errors, and the estimate of the 
causal path for each detailed step may be requested from the authors.  
To summarize, we have demonstrated construct and predictive validity of we-intentions 
by the within-members expanded key informant model. Note that all 27 measures in Table 1 have 
been used. 
Finally, we examine the case 2 across-member’s expanded key informant model. In this 
model, each person’s we-intention is represented by one factor and is measured by self and other 
team members. The results of the nested CFAs tests in the case 2 across-member’s case are 
presented in Table 8. The correlated trait, correlated uniqueness model is once again superior : χ2 
(15) = 49.56, p<.001, RMSEA=.09, SRMR=.02, NNFI=.97, and CFI=.99. The introduction of 
one general trait, correlated traits, or correlated uniquenesses significantly drops the chi-square, 
showing improvements over our null model (see χ2 difference tests in Table 8). Further, by 
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including correlated traits, we find that model fit improves over the single trait model. Also the 
integration of the correlated uniquenesses improves the model significantly over the correlated 
trait-error model, showing the need for method effects. Overall, both correlated traits and 
correlated uniquenesses are needed. Based on the satisfactory goodness-of-fit measures, we 
conclude that the data are completely explained by the underlying correlated traits and correlated 
uniquenesses, except for random error. Thus, convergent validity is achieved for the we-intention 
construct in the correlated trait, correlated uniqueness version of the across-members expanded 
key informant model, the across-members case (Figure 4). 
[Insert Table 8 and Figure 4 about here] 
To analyze the degree of convergent validity, the variance is decomposed into trait, 
correlated uniqueness, and errors for the across-members model; we gain an indication of 
convergent and discriminant validity of we-intentions of each team member. All factor loadings 
are statistically significant with moderately high to high loadings, demonstrating convergent 
validity. Therefore, each team member is strongly perceived by self and others as a team 
member. This is supported by looking at the factor correlations, which indicate a lack of 
discriminant validity and can be interpreted as showing strong mutuality amongst members . 
Table 9 presents all parameter estimates for the across-members expanded key informant model.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
Last, we demonstrate the predictive validity of the expanded key informant model by 
analyzing a causal model, where again a second-order attachment factor predicts a second-order 
we-intentions factor . The model shows a satisfactory fit: χ2 (110)=356.67, p<.001, 
RMSEA=.09, SRMR=.079, NNFI=.94 and CFI=.96. Explained variance in we-intentions is 44 
percent, showing strong predictive validity. Again this explained variance arises from only one 
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exogenous construct. Parameter estimates and descriptive statistics for each detailed step for the 
across-members model may be requested from the authors.  
In sum, we showed construct validity and predictive validity of we-intentions for the case 
2 expanded key informant model. All 27 measures shown in Table 1 have been used. 
DISCUSSION 
We developed and illustrated key informant measurement models for constructs 
functioning at the group-level, as well as structural models where exogenous and endogenous 
variables are tested within a larger theory . Respondents provided information about their own 
and team-mates’ judgments of group-level properties. Here key informants function analogous to 
“methods” in MTMM designs (e.g., Seidler 1974; Bagozzi et al. 1991). A trait in our proposed 
measurement model is a group level property, while the methods constitute appraisals by self and 
by team-mates. We hypothesized that both trait and method factors are necessary in order to 
explain the variances in the measures of our group-level constructs, in addition to random error. 
Traits in the key informant models represent a kind of collective intentionality. Estimates 
of the traits are provided, in the three person team-case, from three perspectives: (1) self-
estimates of the collective property (A(A(A)), B(B(B)), C(C(C))), (2) estimates of the collective 
property provided by each team-mate of each of the other team-mates (A(A(B)), A(A(C)), 
B(B(A)), B(B(C)), C(C(A)), C(C(B))), and (3) estimates of mutuality of the collective property 
held by all team-mates in common (A(B(A)), A(B(B)), A(B(C)), A(C(A)), A(C(B)), A(C(C)), 
B(A(A)), (B(A(B)), B(A(C)), B(C(A)), B(C(B)), B(C(C)), C(A(A)), C(B(A)), C(B(B)), 
C(B(C))). For the revised classic key informant model, only the nine measures from the first two 
perspectives are utilized: namely, self-appraisals and appraisals of others as to their shared 
collective intention. Here each factor is a collective property of a respective team member (see 
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Figure 1). Mutual appraisals of team-mates (i.e., second-order appraisals) are not taken into 
account. 
For the expanded key informant models, information from all three levels is utilized. 
Under the within-members version of the expanded key informant model, each trait represents a 
collective property as estimated by a single team-mate, and measures from all three levels 
corresponding to the respective team-mate are incorporated (see Figure 3). Under the across-
members version of the expanded key informant model, each trait represents a collective 
property of a team-mate, as estimated by all three team-mates, and again measures from all three 
levels are incorporated, but in this case different combinations of estimates from perspectives 2 
and 3 are used than in the within-members model (see Figure 4). The latter characteristic can be 
interpreted better by scrutinizing method effects below. 
Method effects are captured in the revised classic key informant model through nine 
correlated residuals, where these correspond to within team-mate sources of bias (Figure 2). That 
is, correlated errors have a judge in common, under our judge (actor (target)) notation. Method 
effects are also captured in the within-members expanded key informant model through nine 
correlated residuals, but here correlated errors have a target in common (Figure 3). Likewise, 
method effects are captured in the across-members expanded key informant model through nine 
correlated residuals, but here it is the judge that is again in common, because each factor is of a 
particular team-mate as judged by all judges, including the self (Figure 4). 
Findings reveal that the key informant models all fit well but that differences exist with 
respect to agreement across team-mates in construct validity and predictive validity. The within-
members expanded key informant model is clearly the worst model. Recall that in this model, 
we-intentions for each person is measured by responses only from that person, albeit at all three 
 31 
levels: first-order self-judgments of we-intentions, first-order judgments made by self of team-
mates’ we-intentions, and second-order judgments made by self of what he or she believes that 
one team-mate believes the remaining team’s we-intentions are (Figure 3). Results show that, 
while convergent validity is very high (factor leadings range from .88 to .95), agreement 
amongst team-mates is only moderate to moderately high (i.e. correlations among the group-
level we-intention factors range from .36 to .53). Moreover, the within-members expanded key 
informant model achieved the lowest explained variance in the prediction of we-intentions by 
attachment (R2=.40). 
Contrarily, both the revised classic key informant model (Figure 2) and the across-
members expanded key informant model (Figure 4) achieved very high agreement amongst team 
mates: i.e., the correlations among we-intentions of persons A, B, and C ranged from .90 to .95 
and from .92 to .93, respectively. On the other hand, convergent validity for both models was 
less than that found for the within-members expanded key informant model: i.e., the factor 
loadings ranged from .49 to .67 and from .50 to .73, respectively, for the classic key informant 
model and the across-members expanded key informant model. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that the levels of convergent validity may be judged satisfactory for the latter two models. 
Finally, the explained variance in we-intentions for the across-members expanded key informant 
model was higher than the within-members model (R2=.44 vs R2=.40), and the explained 
variance in we-intentions for the key informant model was higher yet (R2=.55). 
In summary, the revised classic key informant model achieves high agreement among 
team-mates, satisfactory convergent validity, and the highest predictive validity of all three 
models. It is also the most parsimonious model in that only 9 of 27 measures are needed to 
implement it (see Table 1). 
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However, it is important to point out that the revised classic key informant model may 
not necessarily be the best approach in all contexts. The subjects in the present study, computer 
gamers, were members of a team, but team-mates interacted on the internet and games were 
played on the internet. For face-to-face teams in other settings, people may know each other very 
well and may be able to provide even more valid data for the across-members enhanced key 
informant model, where 27 measures are employed, than for the virtual teams studied herein. 
Because it is more difficult to establish convergent validity and agreement of team members, 
when 27 versus 9 measures are used, such an approach provides a more stringent test of validity. 
For our web-based study where knowledge of team-mates is constrained by mediated 
communication, it is likely that the key informant model was easier to understand and more 
representative of respondents’ knowledge of team-mates. The key informant model rests on the 
provision of self-judgments of shared intentions and judgments of team-mates’ shared intentions 
(i.e., on estimates one makes of one’s own and partners’ intentions to act in a mutual manner). 
By contrast, the across-members expanded key informant model adds second-order judgments to 
the aforementioned first-order judgments. That is, each person is also asked to estimate what 
they (partner A) think that one partner (B) thinks the remaining partner’s (C’s) we-intention is. 
This is a more difficult task in virtual teams than face-to-face teams, such as found in 
organizations. 
High convergent validity for within-members is most likely a result of common method 
biases. Each group-level variable is measured by responses from one team-mate only. Thus 
convergence of responses across measures is likely to be inflated by respondent bias common to 
his or her representation of the group-level construct. This is probably also why agreement 
 33 
across team-mates is relatively lower for within-members than either across-members or the 
classic key informant model. 
The revised classic key informant and across-members expanded key informant models 
use a fundamentally different measurement approach than the within-members expanded key 
informant model. For the former, each group-level factor for a team-mate is measured by 
judgments from all team-mates. This makes it more difficult to achieve convergent validity and, 
in fact, follows closely the original MTMM philosophy of using maximally dissimilar methods 
as a stringent test of construct validity. Notice, too, that correlated errors, analogous to method 
biases, are modeled in a way corresponding to the source of common judgments by team 
members across factors. For the within-members expanded key informant model, common 
method biases occur for measures of the same factor but are not modeled; rather method bias is 
represented at the target level. But method bias, if any, would be expected to arise from 
judgments made by each team-mate, functioning as a method. 
To summarize, either the revised classic key informant model or the across-members 
expanded key informant model can be used to model trait, method, and error variance to 
ascertain construct validity (i.e., convergent and discriminant validity, where lack of 
discrimination is desired because it supports agreement across informants) and to accomplish 
valid tests of predictions. This approach overcomes the confounding of method and random error 
biases in Seidler’s (1974) original proposal for taking into account information from key 
informants. We also demonstrated how Seidler’s (1974) insights can be extended to model and 
test for group-level concepts, in a manner analogous to Seidler’s organization-level model. We 
showed how group- level concepts can be studied in a way both eliminating and estimating 
method and random error bias and at the same time identifying substantive hypotheses (e.g., trait 
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variance, prediction) inherent in any group-level concepts. Key parameter estimates are corrected 
for such biases. 
LIMITATIONS AND NEXT STEPS 
Our research has the following shortcomings. First, data collection can be complex under 
the key informant models. Overall, nine measures per construct are necessary in a three-person 
group to operationalize the classic key informant model. Because the number of necessary items 
increases exponentially with increasing numbers of members on a team, questionnaires can 
become lengthy; likewise, complex structural equation implementations will be needed in such 
cases. Nevertheless, it is possible with our composition model to also operationalize unbalanced 
groups where different numbers of members exist across teams. Here one could include dynamic 
features in a survey to generate the questions. Further research is needed to simplify our 
composition model and adapt it to larger sized groups.  
Second, in our study, we only used single-item measures for each construct wherein each 
team member provided responses corresponding to the actor-target combination shown in Table 
1. Future enquiry might explore the use of multiple items for each construct as gathered by the 
judge (actor (target)) framework. This of course would lengthen any questionnaire considerably. 
Third, we studied computer gamers. Further research might apply our models within such 
group contexts as family decision making, to investigate conflict and harmony in the family, 
organizational buying centers or account management teams, to study team heterogeneity and 
team performance, nurse teams in hospitals, to analyze different evaluations of patient’s medical 
conditions and therapies across hospitals, or in virtual communities where electronic 
collaboration takes place. It seems fruitful as well to develop the approach devised herein to 
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investigate networks of teams. Still another avenue for future research is to test the consequences 
of using different group sizes or unbalanced teams within any group size. 
Our findings show that cross-evaluations of, and within, team-members are theoretically 
and methodologically meaningful when examining group-level constructs. Only by doing this 
can we take into account information from all group members and separate out trait, method, and 
error effects. Our results also imply that the measurement models permit researchers to answer a 
number of unresolved questions in group behavior and may lead to a different understanding of 
groups, the degree of cohesion or solidarity in the group, definitions of collective goals and 
collective intentions, the presence of deviants in groups, the occurrence of coalitions, the 
influence of group heterogeneity on group achievement, and group formation. A final extension 
of our approach could be to time series analyses where group processes might be studied 
dynamically. 
In conclusion, our key informant models and findings offer new insights regarding 
multilevel measurement and its application in group settings. Overall, we find that the sociality 
of individuals offers rich opportunities for investigating group phenomena across levels of 
analysis. The principles discussed herein have relevance for theory building, hypothesis testing, 
and improving measurement. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 The examples presented here are for person A. Parallel outcomes result for persons B and C. 
See Table 1. 
2 We chose the correlated uniqueness model for purposes of illustration. It is also possible to 
create analogous models in the additive trait-method-error model, the direct product model, or 
the method-effect model, among others (see Bagozzi 2011; Bagozzi, Yi, and Phillips 1991; Pohl, 
Steyer, and Kraus 2008). But the correlated uniqueness model has been found to be the most 
stable and to suffer less from estimation problems (Marsh and Bailey 1991), especially with 
three or less traits (Eid et al. 2008). In our models, illustrated herein, we always utilize three 
traits. 
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TABLE 1 
Proposed Design for a Three-Person Group  
 
 
 
   Target partner  
Judge Actor A B C 
Judge A A A(A) A(B)* A(C)* 
 B A(B(A)) A(B(B)) A(B(C)) 
 C A(C(A)) A(C(B)) A(C(C)) 
Judge B A B(A(A)) B(A(B)) B(A(C)) 
 B B(A)* B(B) B(C)* 
 C B(C(A)) B(C(B)) B(C(C)) 
Judge C A C(A(A)) C(A(B)) C(A(C)) 
 B C(B(A)) C(B(B)) C(B(C)) 
 C C(A)* C(B)* C(C) 
 
Note: A, B, and C refer to the three team-mates and express judge(actor(target)) information. 
Entries with an asterisk refer to the generalized round robin design suggested by Bond, Horn and 
Kenny (1997). The key informant model includes first-order evaluation entries enclosed in 
rectangles. 
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TABLE 2 
Correlation Matrix With Means and Standard Deviations for Measures in the Revised Key 
Informant Correlated Trait-Correlated Uniqueness Model For We-Intentions  
 
 
 
Items A(A) A(B) A(C) B(A) B(B) B(C) C(A) C(B) C(C) mean s.d. 
A(A) 1         5.43 1.560 
A(B) .794 1        5.51 1.441 
A(C) .812 .755 1       5.40 1.524 
B(A) .436 .350 .404 1      5.43 1.388 
B(B) .432 .423 .394 .749 1     5.40 1.509 
B(C) .377 .366 .393 .743 .737 1    5.36 1.479 
C(A) .326 .281 .329 .344 .260 .255 1   5.35 1.498 
C(B) .344 .360 .344 .283 .323 .281 .790 1  5.40 1.502 
C(C) .295 .315 .321 .264 .280 .267 .795 .859 1 5.39 1.542 
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TABLE 3 
 
Comparison of Different Key-Informant Models For Construct Validity of We-Intentions 
 
 
Models and comparisons χ2 (df), p RMSEA SRMR NNFI CFI 
(0) Null model 2361.86 (36) 
p<.000 
.486 .438 .182 .182 
      
(1) Single trait model 1001.47 (27) 
p<.001 
.363 .200 .440 .580 
      
(2) Correlated trait-error model 869.73 (24) 
p<.001 
.359 .172 .426 .617 
      
(3) Correlated trait- 
      correl. uniqueness model 
 
21.12 (15) 
p=.133 
.039 .021 .995 .998 
Δχ201 (9) = 1360.39, p<.001 
Δχ202 (12) = 1492.13, p<.001 
Δχ203 (21) = 2340.74, p<.001 
Δχ212 (3) = 131.74, p<.001 
Δχ213 (12) = 980.35, p<.001 
Δχ223 (9) = 848.61, p<.001 
     
Note: The sub-scripts for χ2-difference tests point to model comparisons; for instance Δχ202 
refers to the comparison of the null to the correlated trait-error model.  
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TABLE 4 
 
Parameter Estimates of the Key Informant Correlated Trait-Correlated Uniqueness Model For 
We-Intentions  
 
 
 
Method-trait 
Factor 
Loadings 
 
Correlated Uniqueness 
 
Factor Correlations 
We-intention of A    
A(A(A)) .65 (.07) .56 (.08)  
A(B(A)) .67 (.07) .41 (.07)    .60 (.08)  
A(C(A)) .52 (.07) .40 (.07)    .37 (.07)   .58 (.08)  
We-intention of B    
B(A(B)) .61 (.07) .56 (.09)    1.00 
B(B(B)) .66 (.08) .37 (.07)    .58 (.09)    .90 (.03)   1.00 
B(C(B)) .54 (.07) .38 (.07)    .37 (.08)   .64 (.08)    .93 (.03)     .95 (.02)   1.00 
We-intention of C    
C(A(C)) .64 (.07) .74 (.08)  
C(B(C)) .61 (.08) .56 (.07)    .72 (.08)  
C(C(C) .49 (.07) .58 (.07)    .62 (.07)   .77 (.08)  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
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TABLE 5 
 
Mean, Standard Deviation, Reliabilities, and Internal Consistency Statistics for Causal Model of 
Attachment on We-Intention Measured by the Key Informant Correlated Uniqueness 
Measurement Model  
 
 
 
 
 
Construct 
 
Number of  
Measures 
 
 
Mean 
 
Standard  
Deviation 
Composite 
Reliability 
(ρε) 
Att of A 3 5.37 1.12 .821 
Att of B 3 5.39 1.12 .912 
Att of C 3 5.38 1.33 .880 
Attachment 3 5.38 1.19 .964 
We-Inten of A 3 5.38 1.15 .913 
We-Inten of B 3 5.42 1.32 .941 
We-Inten of C 3 5.37 1.33 .878 
We-Intention 3 5.40 1.26 .970 
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 TABLE 6 
 
Comparison of Within-Member Models for the Expanded Key Informant Approach 
 
 
Models χ2 (df), p RMSEA SRMR NNFI CFI 
(0) Null Model 2933.30 (36) 
p<.001 
.540 .49 .068 .068 
(1) Single Trait Model 1277.11 (27) 
p<.001 
.410 .24 .32 .49 
(2) Corr. Trait-Error Model 127.23 (24) 
p<.001 
.125 .019 .95 .97 
(3) Corr. Trait-Corr.  
      Uniqueness Model 
13.26 (15) 
p=.581 
.000 .014 1.00 1.00 
Δχ201 (9) = 1656.19, p<.001      
Δχ202 (12) = 2806.07, p<.001      
Δχ203 (21) = 2920.04, p<.001      
Δχ212 (3) = 1149.88, p<.001      
Δχ213 (12) = 1263.85, p<.001      
Δχ223 (9) = 113.97, p<.001      
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TABLE 7 
 
Parameter Estimates of the Within-Member Expanded Key Informant Correlated Trait,  
Correlated Uniqueness Model Concerning We-Intention  
 
 
 
Method-Trait 
Factor 
Loadings 
 
Correlated Uniqueness 
 
Factor Correlations 
We-Intention by A    
A(A(A)),A(B(A)),A(C(A)) .93 (.05) .12 (.02)  
A(A(B)),A(B(B)),A(C(B)) .94 (.05) .04 (.01)    .14 (.02)  
A(A(C)),A(B(C)),A(C(C)) .92 (.05) .05 (.01)    .05 (.01)   .13 (.02)  
We-Intention by B    
B(B(B)),B(A(B)),B(C(B)) .92 (.05) .11 (.02) 1.00 
B(B(A)),B(A(A)),B(C(A)) .92 (.05) .03 (.01)    .15 (.02) .53 (.05)   1.00 
B(B(C)),B(A(C)),B(C(C)) .88 (.05) .04 (.01)    .03 (.01)   .12 (.02) .36 (.06)     .38 (.05)   1.00 
We-Intention by C    
C(C(C)),C(A(C)),C(B(C)) .95 (.05) .15 (.02)  
C(C(A)),C(A(A)),C(B(A)) .93 (.05) .03 (.02)    .23 (.03)  
C(C(B)),C(A(B)),C(B(B)) .94 (.05) .01 (.01)    .02 (.01)   .09 (.01)  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, non-significant effects in italics; A, B, C refer to the three 
team-mates and express judge (actor (target)). 
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TABLE 8 
 
Comparison of Across-Members Models for the Expanded Key Informant Analyses 
 
 
Items χ2 (df), p RMSEA SRMR NNFI CFI 
(0) Null Model 2924.49 (36), 
p<.001 
.541 .487 .067 .067 
(1) Single Trait Model 1276.87 (27) 
p<.001 
.410 .234 .318 .489 
(2) Corr. Trait-Error Model 1144.12 (24) 
p<.001 
.411 .187 .270 .514 
(3) Corr. Trait, Corr.   
     Uniqueness Model 
49.56 (15) 
p<.001 
.091 .023 .971 .988 
Δχ201 (9) = 1647.62, p<.001      
Δχ202 (12) = 1780.37, p<.001      
Δχ203 (21) = 2874.93, p<.001      
Δχ212 (3) = 132.75, p<.001      
Δχ213 (12) = 1227.31, p<.001      
Δχ223 (9) = 1094.56, p<.001      
Note: The sub-scripts for χ2-difference tests point to model comparisons; for instance Δχ202 
refers to the comparison of the null to the correlated trait-error model.  
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TABLE 9 
 
Parameter Estimates of the Across-Members Expanded Key Informant Correlated Trait, 
Correlated Uniqueness Model Concerning We-Intention  
 
 
Method-Trait Factor 
Loadings 
Correlated Uniqueness Factor Correlations 
We-Intention of A    
A(A(A)),A(B(A)),A(C(A)) .68 (.06) .51 (.07)  
B(B(A)),B(A(A)),B(C(A)) .73 (.07) .45 (.07)    .58 (.08)  
C(C(A)),C(A(A)),C(B(A)) .56 (.06) .44 (.07)    .47 (.07)   .59 (.08)  
We-Intention of B    
B(B(B)),B(A(B)),B(C(B)) .72 (.07) .47 (.08) 1.00 
A(A(B)),A(B(B)),A(C(B)) .64 (.07) .38 (.07)    .48 (.07) .93 (.02)   1.00 
C(C(B)),C(A(B)),C(B(B)) .53 (.06) .36 (.07)    .35 (.07)   .52 (.08) .92 (.02)     .93 (.02)   1.00 
We-Intention of C    
C(C(C)),C(A(C)),C(B(C)) .50 (.06) .68 (.07)  
A(A(C)),A(B(C)),A(C(C)) .63 (.07) .60 (.07)    .72 (.07)  
B(B(C)),B(A(C)),B(C(C)) .70 (.07) .64 (.07)    .65 (.07)   .75 (.08)  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; A, B, and C refer to team members and express judge 
(actor (target)). 
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FIGURE 1 
 
Key Informant Correlated Trait, Correlated Uniqueness Model  
Concerning We-Intention Construct  
 
A(A(A)) A(B(B)) A(C(C)) B(A(A)) B(B(B)) B(C(C)) C(A(A)) C(B(B)) C(C(C))
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 e8 e9
We  
Intention  of  
A
We  
Intention  of  
B
We  
Intention  of  
C
 
 
Note: A, B, and C refer to the three team-mates and express judge (actor (target)). 
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FIGURE 2 
 
Causal Model of Attachment on We-Intention Based on the  
Key Informant Correlated Trait Correlated Uniqueness Models  
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Note: A, B, and C refer to the three team-mates and express judge (actor (target)). ATT= 
attachment. 
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FIGURE 3 
 
Within-Members Expanded Key Informant Correlated Trait, Correlated Uniqueness Model Concerning 
We-Intention Construct 
 
 
We  
Intention  
by  B
We  
Intention  
by  A
We  
Intention  
by  C
A(A(A))
A(B(A))
A(C(A))
A(A(B))
A(B(B))
A(C(B))
A(A(C))
A(B(C))
A(C(C))
B(B(B))
B(A(B))
B(C(B))
B(B(A))
B(A(A))
B(C(A))
B(B(C))
B(A(C))
B(C(C))
C(C(C))
C(A(C))
C(B(C))
C(C(A))
C(A(A))
C(B(A))
C(C(B))
C(A(B))
C(B(B))
e1 e2 e3 e4 e5 e6 e7 e8 e9
 
 
Note: A, B, and C refer to three team-mates and express judge (actor (target)). Dashed curved lines are 
used to better illustrate the three sets of correlated errors. 
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FIGURE 4 
 
Across-Members Expanded Key Informant Correlated Trait, Correlated Uniqueness Model Concerning 
We-Intention Construct 
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Note: A, B, and C refer to the three team-mates and express judge (actor (target)). Dashed curved lines 
are used to better illustrate the three sets of correlated errors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
